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License to Cheat: Voluntary Regulation and Unethical Behavior 
 
Abstract 
While monitoring and regulation can be used to combat socially costly unethical conduct, their intended 
targets are often able to avoid regulation or hide their behavior. This surrenders at least part of the 
effectiveness of regulatory policies to firms’ and individuals’ decisions to voluntarily submit to 
regulation. We study individuals’ decisions to avoid monitoring or regulation and thus enhance their 
ability to engage in unethical conduct. We conduct a laboratory experiment in which participants engage 
in a competitive task and can decide between having the opportunity to misreport their performance or 
having their performance verified by an external monitor. To study the effect of social factors on the 
willingness to be subject to monitoring, we vary whether participants make this decision simultaneously 
with others or sequentially, as well as whether the decision is private or public. Our results show that the 
opportunity to avoid being submitted to regulation produces more unethical conduct than situations in 
which regulation is either exogenously imposed or entirely absent.  
 
Keywords: ethical behavior; dishonesty; regulation; selection; social norms 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The popular and business press regularly reports instances of unethical conduct by firms and 
individuals.  Recent  examples  from  the  business  world  include  fraudulent  and  deceptive  banking, 
marketing,  and  securities  trading  practices,  such  as  those  involving  Barclay’s,  Capital  One, 
GlaxoSmithKline,  and  Bernard  Madoff.  These  instances  received  considerable  attention  both  for  the 
seriousness of the ethical lapses involved and for their impact on economic and societal welfare. Tax 
fraud and avoidance by firms and individuals, believed to be commonplace, imply large revenue losses 
for  governments  and  shift  the  fiscal  burden  elsewhere  in  society.  In  athletics,  stunning  individual 
achievements across many sports – e.g., cycling, baseball, and swimming – are often met with skepticism 
regarding  the  extent  to  which  they  resulted  from  the  use  of  illicit  performance-enhancing  drugs.  In 
academia, fraudulent research and student cheating pose serious challenges for the credibility of scientific 
inquiry and higher education. 
Given the breadth of decision domains in which actors face the temptation to act unethically and 
the far-reaching consequences of such unethical behavior, it is important to examine how such acts can 
best be discouraged. One powerful tool on which policymakers can rely is regulation in the form of  
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monitoring and sanctions. For example, the desire to limit predatory behavior and deceptive marketing 
practices on behalf of firms led to the creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, a product of 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial reform bill, which has the power to monitor firm practices and impose 
fines.  Tax-collection  agencies  are  given  considerable  power  to  investigate  financial  information  and 
impose sanctions for underreported income. In athletics, regulatory entities, such as the World Anti-
Doping Agency, possess considerable power to test for banned substances and impose or recommend 
serious  penalties.  Indeed,  prior  research  demonstrates  that  stronger  monitoring  and  sanctions  can 
discourage unethical conduct, though sometimes with limited effectiveness (e.g., Andreoni, et al., 1998; 
Nagin, et al., 2002; Olken, 2007). 
One potential limitation of the effectiveness of regulation occurs when firms and individuals can 
influence the extent to which they are subject to rules and monitoring. For example, manufacturing firms 
confronted with varying state or national labor and environmental regulations may choose which set of 
regulations to follow by deciding where to locate (Levinson and Taylor, 2008; Hanna, 2010). Similarly, 
credit-card companies have historically incorporated in Delaware, which affords them the opportunity to 
avoid  more  stringent  regulation  elsewhere  (see  for  example  Ausubel,  1991).  Firms  also  can  give 
themselves the flexibility to behave unethically, as when deciding whether to voluntarily agree to be 
bound by a particular set of standards, such as the requirements of FairTrade or EPEAT green production.  
Along the same lines, Enron’s well-known switch from historical cost (book value) to mark-to-market 
(fair value) valuation and its decision to suspend its code of ethics gave the firm added flexibility to 
engage in financial malfeasance. 
Opportunities  to  influence  the  degree  of  regulation  by  which  one  is  bound  also  exist  at  the 
individual level. An academic researcher may choose to submit research to journals with varying data 
availability and replication policies. A student may select universities or courses with varying oversight 
and policies to combat cheating. And a wealthy individual may choose to hide wealth from tax authorities 
by relying on bank accounts in countries with high degrees of banking secrecy. Similarly, during the 2012 
U.S. presidential election, Republican candidate Mitt Romney chose not to publicly release more than a 
year’s worth of tax returns, a decision that prevented greater public monitoring of his financial activities 
and potential conflicts of interest.  
Even when they make no explicit choice among regulatory regimes, individuals and firms may 
have other avenues through which they can avoid monitoring and regulation. For example, anti-doping 
efforts  in  athletics  are  regularly  hampered  by  medical  advances  that  make  detection  difficult  or 
impossible, thereby giving athletes or teams who engage in doping the ability to avoid regulation and 
monitoring  altogether.  Lobbying  efforts  and  regulatory  capture  by  firms  can  allow  them  to  create 
loopholes or entirely avoid the enforcement of regulation.  
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As  these  examples  illustrate,  regulation  is  often  of  limited  effectiveness,  not  solely  due  to 
exogenous factors that make detection or enforcement difficult, but also because those who are supposed 
to be regulated may have the ability to determine how much regulation they face or even whether they 
face it at all. Thus, at least two types of choices may be critical in determining the degree to which 
unethical behavior occurs in contexts where it is possible. First, an individual or firm can choose to 
behave unethically, if given the opportunity. This kind of decision has been studied extensively, as we 
review below. Second, an individual or firm may be able to choose whether to have the opportunity to 
behave unethically, as in the cases discussed above. Despite the potential importance of these kinds of 
“voluntary regulation” choices, they have received relatively little research attention; similarly, the factors 
that influence voluntary regulation choices, and their ultimate consequences on unethical conduct, are not 
well researched.   
In  this  paper,  we  explicitly  study  the  decision  of  whether  to  voluntarily  submit  to  stricter 
regulation and the extent to which this decision affects subsequent unethical behavior. Mirroring many of 
the  situations  described  above,  in  which  firms  or  individuals  can  obtain  a  financial  or  competitive 
advantage  by  behaving  unethically,  we  study  behavior  in  a  zero-sum  competitive  setting  in  which 
unethical conduct – misreporting one’s performance – advantages one party at the expense of another. 
And, to obtain high levels of control over the presence and nature of regulation and the underlying 
behavior, we use a laboratory experiment in which we can carefully vary features of the environment 
while keeping all else constant.  
Throughout the paper, we use the term “regulation” broadly, to refer to an effective form of 
monitoring and sanctions that prevents unethical conduct. For simplicity, we consider two extremes in 
terms of regulation: individuals’ behavior is either entirely unregulated, such that they have the freedom 
to act as unethically as they would like, or entirely regulated, in which case they have no opportunity to 
behave unethically. We distinguish between exogenous regulation, which is imposed on individuals by an 
outside entity (i.e., the experimenter)  without opportunities for avoidance, and endogenous voluntary 
regulation, under which the same regulatory regime is present but each individual can decide whether his 
or her own behavior is subject to regulation.  
We focus on two major decisions that participants in our experiment make. First, we study their 
choice of regulation (when regulation is voluntary) and the factors that affect their willingness to be 
subject to regulation. Second, we study the ultimate unethical behavior following this initial choice – i.e., 
the extent to which they over-report their performance in order to obtain greater financial gains.  
In the experiment, participants perform a simple task and receive a payoff based on whether their 
resulting  score  is  higher  than  that  of  another  participant  (cf.  Gino,  Ayal,  and  Ariely,  2009).  In  two 
baseline conditions, participants cannot choose whether an experimenter verifies the accuracy of their  
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performance: in a mandatory-regulation condition, the performance of all participants is verified; in a no-
regulation condition, all participants are free to report any score, and none of the reported scores are 
verified. We compare the scores obtained in these two conditions with voluntary-regulation conditions in 
which we allow participants to choose, before they engage in the task, whether to have their scores 
verified. Thus, we observe participants’ decisions of whether to be regulated as well as the resulting score 
they obtain.  
To  understand  how  psychological  and  social  factors  may  influence  regulation  choice  in  the 
voluntary-regulation  conditions,  we  also  introduce  treatments  that  vary  two  factors:  (1)  whether  the 
decision is made privately (choices of whether to be regulated are not observed by other participants) or 
publicly (regulation choices are observed by the other participants), and (2) whether the decision is made 
simultaneously or sequentially. These treatments also allow us to examine how information about others’ 
regulation choices influences individuals’ decisions regarding whether to be regulated, as well as their 
resulting reported scores in the competitive task. 
Our results show that there is significantly more misreporting under voluntary regulation (where 
participants have a choice of whether to  be regulated) than under either no regulation or mandatory 
regulation. This is despite the fact that a significant proportion of participants opt to be regulated in the 
voluntary regulation conditions. Thus, allowing individuals to voluntarily choose whether to be subject to 
regulation might lead to greater unethical behavior than when behavior is completely unregulated. We 
find that selection based on relative skill plays a role in determining who opts for regulation (such that 
those likely to perform worse on the competitive task opt to not be regulated) and that the choice not to  
be regulated appears to give participants greater “license to cheat,” relative to when regulation is entirely 
absent.  
We  also  examine  whether  the  presence  or  absence  of  regulation  in  one  context  influences 
behavior in other domains. Keizer et al. (2008) find that disorderly and petty criminal behavior in one 
setting has a spillover effect that triggers more disorderly and petty criminal behavior in a second setting. 
Similar spillover effects may occur in the case of ethical behavior. To explore such potential “ethical 
spillovers,”  we  use  a  second  non-skill  based  competitive  task  in  which  no  regulation  exists  and 
participants can therefore report any score they wish. We find that misreporting of scores in this second 
task is affected by the presence or absence of regulation in the first task; specifically, our results show that 
any possibility of misreporting scores in the first task yields greater unethical conduct in the second task. 
That is, in terms of ethical spillovers to other contexts, having regulation that is avoidable (voluntary) 
yields  similar  outcomes  as  when  regulation  is  entirely  absent,  and  both  conditions  are  worse  than 
mandatory and inescapable regulation.  
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In addition to contributing to the understudied behavior of regulation decisions, our findings have 
important practical implications. For example, our results suggest that policies that impose  either no 
regulation or total regulation may be preferable to policies that allow for regulation that can be easily 
circumvented. Moreover, unethical conduct itself is often difficult to observe or verify, but, in many 
situations, the initial choice regarding whether to have the flexibility to behave unethically is much easier 
to observe. We find that increasing the visibility of the choice to be regulated can be used as a tool to 
enhance the voluntary adoption of regulation and decrease subsequent unethical behavior. Finally, we 
show  that  a  policymaker’s  choices  concerning  the  presence  of  regulation  in  one  domain  can  affect 
behavior in other, unregulated contexts. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the relevant literature and 
develop hypotheses that we test in our experiment. In section 3, we describe the experimental design. In 
section 4, we present our results. We discuss the main findings and conclude in section 5. 
2. Relevant Literature and Hypotheses 
Partly because of its pervasiveness in organizations and society more broadly, unethical behavior 
has attracted the attention of scholars from various disciplines. Much of the research examines the causes 
and consequences of unethical behavior in economic, organizational, and political contexts (Gneezy 2005; 
Fisman and Gatti 2002; Gino, Ayal, and Ariely, 2009; Burks and Krupka 2012).  
Using evidence from both field and laboratory studies, this research generally explores the extent 
to which people behave unethically and the factors that influence such behavior. For example, Carpenter, 
Matthew, and Schirm (2010) found that sabotage among coworkers is higher in tournaments than it is 
under piece-rate compensation. Pierce and Snyder (2008) showed that unethical conduct by automobile 
inspectors is influenced by the presence of unethical conduct in the organization where those inspectors 
work. Related research conducted in laboratory settings examines how individuals’ unethical behavior 
often arises through vertical specialization, which diffuses the responsibility for behaving unethically 
(Ellman and Pezanis-Christou, 2010; Hamman, Weber, and Loewenstein, 2010). A growing body of 
research also notes the ways in which people are self-serving in their interpretation of what constitutes 
ethical behavior (for reviews, see Ayal and Gino, 2011; Dana, Loewenstein, and Weber, 2011). Finally, a 
substantial  literature  examines  the  effects  of  ethical  norms  or  behavior  among  management  and 
employees in firms, often relying on survey or field data (Jones and Kavanagh, 1996; Schminke et al., 
2005; Trevino et al., 2008). 
One focus of research on unethical behavior has been to explore the conditions under which 
individuals behave dishonestly for (monetary) personal gain. For instance, Gneezy (2005) studied the 
extent to which a laboratory participant with private information will lie to an uninformed participant 
about which of two possible actions is more profitable. He found that people are sensitive to both their  
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potential gains from a lie and to their counterparts’ potential losses (see also Croson 2005; Hurkens and 
Kartik, 2009; Sutter, 2009; Gibson, et al., forthcoming; Erat and Gneezy, forthcoming). Recent research 
also explores the conditions under which individuals lie about the outcome of a random process, such as a 
die  roll,  to  gain  more  money  from  an  experimenter  (Gino  and  Ariely,  2012;  Shalvi,  et  al.,  2011; 
Fiscbacher and Heusi, 2008). Other recent work examines how misreporting a score on an individual 
piece-rate task is affected by social and organizational factors. For example, Gino and colleagues found 
that  exposure  to  other  people’s  unethical  behavior  increases  an  individual’s  dishonesty  when  the 
wrongdoer  is  an  in-group  member  (Gino  et  al.,  2009)  or  when  the  individual  feels  similar  to  the 
wrongdoer (Gino & Galinsky, 2012).
1  
Similarly to the above research, our  study explores unethical behavior in situations where lying 
can  yield  better  financial  outcomes.  Our specific   focus  is  on  the effectiveness  of  regulation and 
monitoring, particularly when these can be easily circumvented. That is, we study what happens when 
individuals have the opportunity to decide whether to voluntarily subject themselves to regulation that 
prevents misreporting. The predicted consequences of such voluntary regulation are unclear. Since our 
work is exploratory, we develop plausible hypotheses as a way  of understanding alternative results that 
we might obtain. 
To generate our first hypothesis, we begin by noting that individuals who are given the choice to 
opt for “no regulation” have the same opportunity to behave unethically as those who are in a context 
where there is no possibility of regulation. This holds in our voluntary-regulation conditions, where any 
participant who wishes to misreport her score can forego regulation and do so. Therefore, if there are 
some individuals who are always willing to lie for money and others who are not, it follows that unethical 
behavior in a treatment where individuals are free to privately choose whether to be regulated will not 
differ from unethical behavior when the  behavior of all individuals  is unregulated.
2 Under voluntary 
regulation, those individuals who prefer to behave unethically will choose to be unregulated when offered 
the choice, and individuals who prefer to behave ethically will do so regardless of whether they are 
regulated. This yields our null hypothesis: 
H0(null): Under voluntary regulation, misreporting will be similar to that under no regulation. 
                                                 
1 Burks and Krupka (2012) find that alignment between one’s own views regarding ethical practices and those of 
one’s peers (in-group members) is correlated with ethical behavior. 
2 An implicit assumption is that regulation choices themselves are not subject to social pressure or consequences, 
which is true when they are made privately (as when a taxpayer secretly opens a bank account in a tax haven or an 
athlete privately obtains the ability to circumvent testing). In cases where the regulation choice is made publicly – as 
when a firm chooses to locate in a country with lax labor regulations or when a researcher opts to publish in journals 
with lax data-availability policies – social costs associated with the regulation choice may influence behavior. We 
address this possibility below and in our experiment.  
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The above null hypothesis simply states that voluntary regulation affords equal opportunity for 
unethical behavior as does the absence of regulation; this hypothesis serves as a benchmark against which 
to  compare  what  actually  happens  when  regulation  is  present  but  avoidable.  However,  if  voluntary 
regulation  leads  to  different  outcomes than  the  mere  absence  of  regulation,  why  might  that  be? We 
explore  possible  explanations  for  how  the  act  of  choosing  regulation  might  give  rise  to  different 
subsequent behaviors regarding cheating. 
The decision of whether to avoid regulation may be more readily observable to outsiders than 
cheating itself. For example, a student’s decision to cheat on an exam, when given the opportunity to do 
so, is typically unobservable. But the decision to select a university or courses with more lax misconduct 
enforcement is potentially observable by others and therefore more likely to be subject to social pressures. 
Similarly, a private firm that closes its books to external parties gains considerable flexibility for its 
behavior, but the decision to close the books can be publicly observed. Prior research finds that being 
observed by another person affects ethical conduct (Akerlof and Kranton, 2010; Jones and Kavanagh, 
1996; Gino et al., 2009; Gino, Gu, and Zhong, 2009; Goldstein et al., 2011; Ariely et al. 2009), as well as 
behavior in other contexts outside of ethical decision making, as shown both in psychology (e.g., Asch, 
1956; Kallgren et al., 2000; Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bateson et al., 2006; Burnham and Hare, 2007) and 
in economics (Charness et al., 2007; Rigdon et al., 2009).  
In our context, when the decision to be regulated is publicly observable, we predict this will 
increase the number of individuals opting to be regulated because of social pressure to opt for regulation. 
If fewer people choose to circumvent regulation (through a choice made publicly), the result is likely 
reduced unethical behavior relative to conditions where voluntary regulation choices are private.  
H1(social pressure): If voluntary regulation choices are made publicly, more individuals 
will opt to be regulated, and this increased regulation will result in less misreporting.  
Thus, for example, while U.S. presidential candidates are not required to publicly release tax returns, the 
fact that their decision to do so is public has generally led to greater openness to public monitoring and 
presumably less unethical behavior.  
In a similar vein, considerable research demonstrates that people are influenced by what they 
observe others doing (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Zey-Ferrell et al., 1979; Zey-Ferrell and Ferrell, 1982; 
Jones and Kavanagh, 1996; Brass et al., 1998; Schultz et al., 2007; Krupka and Weber, 2009; Bicchieri 
and Xiao, 2009; Gino & Galinsky, 2012). A person’s decision to be regulated may also be influenced by 
observing the frequency with which others opt for regulation. Drawing on the distinctions Deutsch and 
Gerard outline in their seminal 1955 paper on social influences, we describe this kind of influence as a 
social information influence, whereby people learn something about the frequency with which an action  
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is taken from observing others. When others take a particular action, an individual becomes more likely to 
make  the  same  choice.  Therefore,  we  predict  that  individuals’  voluntary-regulation  choices  will  be 
influenced by the publicly observable regulation choices of earlier movers. Observing another person 
choose regulation will increase a participant’s likelihood of choosing regulation and reduce unethical 
behavior relative to when earlier movers choose to be unregulated.  
H2(social information): If voluntary-regulation choices are public and sequential, then 
individuals’ regulation choices will be influenced by early movers. These regulation choices 
will also determine the amount of misreporting. 
The above two hypotheses focus on social influences, whereby information – either about one’s 
own choice that is provided to others or about others’ choices that one receives prior to opting for or 
against regulation – affects the voluntary-regulation choice and subsequent unethical behavior. But the 
voluntary regulation decision may also interact with the subsequent decision to behave unethically in a 
manner that is not influenced by public information about behavior.  
For example, an individual’s initial decision regarding whether to abide by regulation might take 
place in a “cooler” emotional state, when the person does not feel the temptation or competitive pressure 
to behave unethically, or when this feeling of temptation is psychologically more “distant” and thus also 
less salient (Trope and Lieberman, 2010; Tenbrunsel, et al., 2011). In fact, as demonstrated by Mead et al. 
(2009),  cheating  is  more  likely  to  occur  when  people  are  in  a  “hot”  state  --  that  is,  when  they  are 
cognitively depleted or have little self-control. Thus, an individual in a cool state may choose regulation 
simply because the possibility to behave unethically is not tempting. This means that some people, who 
would  ultimately  behave  unethically  if  the  temptation  to  cheat  were  psychologically  “closer,”  may 
initially  opt  to  be  regulated  and  thereby,  intentionally  or  unintentionally,  constrain  their  subsequent 
conduct. Consistent with this argument, psychological research has robustly demonstrated that individuals 
poorly  anticipate  what  subsequent  choices  they  will  make  (Diekmann  et  al.,  2003;  Woodzicka  and 
LaFrance, 2001). Thus, committing in advance not to cheat, when it is easier to do so, may lead to less 
unethical conduct.
3  
Alternatively, it is also possible for the initial private decision of whether to be regulated to offer 
a psychological path to  increased, rather than reduced, unethical behavior. If people view the initial 
voluntary-regulation decision as one with only minor ethical implications  – since, after all, they can 
always report truthfully later – then they might find it easy to forgo regulation. However, having gone 
down  the  path  of  avoiding  regulation,  people  may  then  find  it  psychologically  easier  to  behave 
                                                 
3 Consistent with this prediction, Sherman (1980) found that study participants over-predicted their own tendency to 
behave in a socially desirable manner (e.g., refusing to write an essay that advocated an opinion counter to their 
own), but these over-predictions were “self-erasing” in that participants subsequently tended to behave consistently 
with their own predictions.  
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unethically. That is, people may view their initial decision regarding regulation as not  very ethically 
important  (“I’m  not  doing  anything  wrong  by  giving  myself  an  option  to  cheat”),  but  may  then 
subsequently rely on that decision as a way to guide their subsequent ethical choices (“Since I gave 
myself the option, I may as well use it”). In a similar way, psychological research has shown that an 
initial small act showing commitment to a course of action can facilitate subsequent larger acts (Freedman 
and Fraser, 1966).  
The two possibilities we discussed above suggest how voluntary regulation may affect subsequent 
unethical behavior even when an individual is unconcerned about others’ behavior or what others think of 
her  own  behavior.  We  test  these  possibilities  in  our  “private”  conditions,  where  participants  do  not 
observe others’ regulation choices. Since the above discussion yields two different directional predictions, 
our hypothesis posits an effect but leaves open the direction. 
H3(behavior facilitation): Private voluntary regulation will either increase or decrease 
unethical conduct relative to when regulation is absent. 
 
We now turn to describing the experimental design we use to test our hypotheses.  
3. Experimental Design 
Our experiment compares two conditions, one in which there is no regulation and one in which 
everyone is regulated (mandatory regulation), to conditions in which individuals  can choose to avoid 
being  regulated  (voluntary  regulation).  To  explore  the  influence  of  timing  and  social  pressure  on 
individuals’ regulation decisions, we conduct four variants of voluntary regulation. Specifically, we vary, 
in a 2 X 2 design, whether participants make regulation choices privately vs. publicly and simultaneously 
vs. sequentially. Therefore, the experiment employed six conditions in total, summarized in Table 1.  
Participants were recruited to the laboratory in groups of six. In all conditions, they completed a 
problem-solving task and self-scored their performance. In the no-regulation condition, participants self-
reported their scores on the problem-solving task, and the experimenter explained that there would be no 
verification of the scores and that participants could take their worksheets with them when they departed. 
In the mandatory-regulation condition, participants reported their scores, and the experimenter verified 
their performance (as described in detail below).  
Insert Table 1 about here 
In  four  voluntary-regulation  conditions,  participants  chose  whether  their  self-reported  score 
would  be  verified  or  not by  the  experimenter.  All choices  regarding  whether  to  be  regulated  in  the 
voluntary-regulation conditions were made prior to the competitive problem-solving task but after the 
experimenter explained this task in detail. An important aspect of our study design is that, in the case of  
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voluntary regulation, all participants had the opportunity to behave unethically. That is, any participants 
who selected not to be regulated had the same opportunity for unethical behavior as did participants in the 
conditions where there was (exogenously) no regulation.  
We recruited voluntary participants for a paid one-hour experiment from the participants’ pool of 
the Center for Behavioral Decision Research at Carnegie Mellon University. On average, participants 
received $14.56 as payment for their participation. A total of 276 individuals participated in 46 sessions 
consisting of six participants each.  
Upon arriving at the laboratory, participants were seated at one of six tables, which were distant 
enough from one another so that participants could not see each other’s choices during the study. Tables 
were numbered from 1 to 6. The study included two competitive constant-sum tasks, a risk task and a 
questionnaire. These tasks were completed one after another, and payments were not revealed until all 
tasks were completed. 
3.1. Task 1: Matrix Task 
As their first task, and the main task in our study, participants completed a competitive problem-
solving task, which has been used to measure unethical behavior in prior work (Mazar et al., 2008; Gino 
et al., 2009). Each participant received two sheets of paper: the first was a worksheet with 20 matrices, 
each containing a set of 12 three-digit numbers (e.g., 5.78). In this task, participants had four minutes to 
find two numbers in each matrix that summed to 10. Participants then reported how many matrices they 
solved. The time constraint is generally insufficient for participants to solve all 20 matrices. Our primary 
interest is in the extent of misreporting in this task.  
The second sheet was a reporting slip on which participants reported their performance. After 
the four minutes had passed, participants folded their worksheet and placed it on their desk and then wrote 
down their performance score (i.e., the number of matrices they correctly solved) on their reporting slip.  
Participants  were  paid  for  this  task  based  on  their  own  score  and  the  score  of  one  other, 
anonymous,  participant.  The  experimenter  randomly  selected  this  participant  from  among  the  other 
participants in the same session. The experimenter compared pairs’ scores privately, so participants did 
not learn the identity of the other participant with whom they were paired. If the score of one participant 
in the randomly chosen pair was higher than the other person’s score, then the high scorer received $6, 
and the low scorer received $3. In the case of a tie, the experimenter flipped a coin to determine who in 
the pair received $6 and who received $3. 
We used this procedure so that cheating on the matrix task by over-reporting performance would 
be costly to another participant in the same session. This assures that the costs of cheating are salient, well 
understood, and meaningful to participants who are deciding whether to cheat. By contrast, in much 
related prior work (e.g., Fischbacher and Heusi, 2008; Gino et al., 2009), the costs of cheating were often  
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unclear, as participants would simply receive a higher payment from the experimenter when they lied 
about their performance on a problem-solving task, thus making unclear who would be impacted by their 
cheating, for at least two reasons. First, the additional money that participants obtained was not clearly 
taken from an identifiable other; the money presumably was not the researcher’s own money, and it is not 
clear how else the money might be used if not to compensate the participant. Second, participants might 
have  interpreted  the  research  context  as  one  in  which  the  researcher  wanted  some  participants  to 
misreport, thus providing the plausible impression that the researcher’s purpose might have benefitted 
from misreporting. Therefore, we believe that our design, in which misreporting clearly creates an unfair 
advantage relative to another participant, represents an improvement in making misreporting more likely 
to be interpreted as unethical. 
In the mandatory-regulation condition, the experimenter verified participants’ score on the matrix 
task.  The  instructions  informed  participants  that,  later  in  the  experiment,  they  would  hand  both  the 
reporting slip and the worksheet to the experimenter and that the experimenter would verify that the score 
was correct (and correct it if it was not) before determining the payment for each pair of participants. In 
the no-regulation condition, instead, there was no such verification of performance by the experimenter. 
In this condition, the instructions informed participants that, later in the experiment, they would only hand 
the reporting slip to the experimenter and that the experimenter would use only the score on this slip to 
determine payment. Participants in the no-regulation condition could take their worksheet with them at 
the end of the experiment.  
In the voluntary regulation conditions, participants could choose whether or not they wanted the 
experimenter to verify their score. Participants were told, 
“You may choose one of two options for reporting your score: 
1. Green Reporting Option: You will report your own score at the end of the experiment and 
the experimenter will verify that your score is correct. You will hand in both your sheet with 
the 20 matrices and your Score Reporting Slip to the experimenter. The experimenter will 
verify the number of matrices that you have correctly solved. Your verified score will be 
compared to another participant’s score to determine your payment. 
2. Blue Reporting Option: You will report your own score at the end of the experiment but 
the experimenter will not verify that your score is correct. You will only hand in your Score 
Reporting Slip to the experimenter but you will not hand in the sheet with the 20 matrices. 
You are free to take it home with you. Your self-reported score will be compared to another 
participant’s score to determine your payment.” 
The  way  in  which  participants  selected  between  the  above  reporting  options  varied  across 
conditions.  In  particular,  we  manipulated  choice  visibility  (public  vs.  private)  and  choice  timing 
(simultaneous vs. sequential), leading to the following four voluntary-regulation conditions:   
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  Private-simultaneous: Participants selected the reporting option by privately choosing one of two 
boxes on their instruction sheet. Participants were instructed to do so at the same time. Following 
these choices, the experimenter went around the room and privately recorded each individual’s 
reporting option. 
  Private-sequential: Participants again made their reporting decisions privately by selecting a box 
on their instruction sheet. In this treatment, however, the experimenter instructed participants to 
do so by turn (by having participants wait until the person ahead of them had recorded his or her 
choice). After all participants selected a reporting option, the experimenter went around the room 
and privately recorded their choices. 
  Public-simultaneous: Participants all made their reporting decisions at the same time but were 
able to observe the reporting choices made by all other participants in their session after doing so. 
Prior to the session, we placed a blue and a green index card on each participant’s desk so that 
they could use them to indicate their choices in the public conditions by raising one of the two 
cards. When it was time to select a reporting option, participants privately chose one of the two 
cards, and then, publicly, each person simultaneously raised either the blue or green card so that 
everyone could see the frequency of each choice. 
  Public-sequential: Participants also indicated a reporting option by raising a card publicly. But, 
rather  than  making  choices  simultaneously,  they  proceeded  one  at  a  time,  prompted  by  the 
experimenter, so that all participants could see the choices of others before them in the session. 
 
We note that, given our design and procedure, we were able to record participants’ true task 
performance only for those in the mandatory-regulation condition and for regulated participants in the 
voluntary-regulation  conditions.  We  were  not  able  to  directly  observe  true  task  performance  for 
unregulated  participants  in  the  voluntary-regulation  conditions,  since  these  participants  had  the 
opportunity to lie about their performance without leaving evidence of their actions.  
3.2. Task 2: Die Roll 
 Upon completion of the first task, but before the experimenter determined the results of this task, 
participants completed a second competitive task in which all participants, regardless of what condition 
of the matrix task they were previously in, had the opportunity to misreport their score. We included this 
task to measure how the experience from the different treatments in the first task may spill over and affect 
unethical behavior in a second task, in which everyone has the opportunity to behave unethically due to 
the absence of regulation. 
Each subject received a die in a plastic cup and was then asked to privately roll the die inside the 
cup (this task is based on Fischbacher and Heusi 2008; see also Shalvi et al. 2011 and Gino and Ariely  
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2012).  Next,  participants  privately  wrote  down  the  number  produced  by  the  die  roll.  This  number 
determined their score for this task. After recording their score, participants were asked to shake the cup 
again to change the position of the die. Thus, participants had the opportunity to misreport the outcome of 
the die roll. 
In the die-roll task, each participant was again randomly and anonymously matched with another 
participant in the room. It was made clear that this was a different participant than the one with whom the 
participant had been matched in the first task. Participants’ payment in this task again depended on their 
score and the other person’s score. As before, if the participant’s score was greater than the other person’s 
score, then the participant received $6. If it was lower, then the participant received $3. In the case of a 
tie, the experimenter flipped a coin to determine who in the pair received $6 and who received $3.  
3.3. Risk Task and Final Questionnaire  
As their third task, participants made choices that we used to assess their risk preferences, as a 
possible control for individual differences. Any payment they accumulated from this task was added to 
their other payoffs from the other parts of the experiment. We assessed individual risk preferences using 
Binswanger’s (1980) procedure. Participants were presented with eight options specified in different rows 
of a table printed for them on a piece of paper. Each option provided them with a payoff if the outcome of 
a coin flip was “Heads” and another payoff if it was “Tails.” Participants were asked to choose one of 
these options. The experimenter then went around the room and tossed a coin to decide which payment 
each participant received based on their decision. The row chosen by a participant provides an estimate of 
his or her risk preferences. 
As their last task in the study, participants then answered a questionnaire asking about their 
gender, age, occupational status, and personality.
4 While they worked on the questionnaire, one of the two 
experimenters left the room to calculate participants’ payoffs. To compute payoffs, this experimenter used 
the reporting slips from task 1 and task 2, together with the matrix worksheet if the participant was to be 
regulated. Next, after participants completed the questionnaire, they each left the room one at a time to 
receive payment privately. 
4. Results 
Table  2  presents  a  summary  of  the  main  outcome  variables  from  the  matrix  task  across 
conditions, namely participants’ reported matrix scores and their voluntary regulation choices. Recall that 
in the no-regulation condition, the mean matrix score is a self-reported score that the experimenter did not 
verify; in the mandatory-regulation condition, the mean matrix score is the verified score; and in the 
voluntary-regulation condition, the mean matrix score includes both verified and unverified scores. Under 
mandatory regulation, participants correctly completed, on average, 5.40 matrices (out of 20). However, 
                                                 
4 We included common measures, some of which have been connected in prior research with ethical behavior.  
 
14 
 
when the experimenter did not verify the scores (no regulation), participants reported completing 9.07 
matrices  on  average.  These  means  differ  significantly  in  a  t-test  (t58  =  3.65,  p  <  0.001),  and  the 
distributions of scores differ significantly in a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z = 3.49, p < 
0.001). Therefore, giving everyone the opportunity to misreport resulted in higher reported scores. This 
result is consistent with prior research showing that when given the opportunity to cheat, people do cheat, 
even if only by a little bit and not to the maximum extent possible (Mazar et al., 2008; Gino et al., 2009). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
The remaining five rows of Table 2 report outcomes from the voluntary-regulation conditions, 
where participants could each choose whether or not they wanted to be regulated.  We first pool all 
conditions with voluntary regulation and then report the results separately for each of the sub-treatments.  
4.1. Does voluntary regulation look like no regulation?  
Our null hypothesis predicted that, in the voluntary-regulation environment, scores on the matrix 
task would be similar to those when there is no regulation. This hypothesis is rejected in the data. The 
mean reported score pooled over all the voluntary-regulation conditions was 12.20 (row 3 in table 2), 
which is significantly higher than under no regulation (t244 = 2.94, p < 0.005). Again, the distributions also 
differ significantly (z = 2.74, p < 0.01). Thus, on aggregate, when participants can decide whether or not 
to be regulated, we observe more misreporting than when everyone is unregulated and has the opportunity 
to misreport. This is perhaps most surprising when one considers that 42% of the participants in the 
voluntary-regulation conditions opted for regulation.  
When we compare the separate sub-treatments with voluntary regulation to the no-regulation 
condition, we similarly observe higher reported scores in all of the four conditions in which participants 
could avoid regulation. In three of these cases, the mean reported scores are significantly higher than 
under no regulation (private-simultaneous: t82 = 3.88, p < 0.001; private-sequential: t82 = 3.99, p < 0.001; 
public-sequential: t82 = 2.10, p < 0.04), while in the public-simultaneous case, the mean reported scores 
are also higher, but the difference is not statistically significant (t82 = 1.05). 
4.2. Do public regulation choices lead to greater regulation?  
We hypothesized that more participants would opt to be regulated when voluntary-regulation 
choices are public rather than private and that this would result in less unethical conduct (H1). When 
participants  make  voluntary-regulation  decisions  publicly,  they  are  indeed  more  likely  to  opt  to  be 
regulated (on average, 52.7% of the time) than when they make these decisions privately (on average, 
31.5%),  with the  two  frequencies  differing  significantly  (χ
2(1)  =  10.04,  p  <  0.005). Therefore,  even 
though the decision to avoid regulation does not necessarily imply unethical conduct, participants appear 
concerned with the social image produced by having others know that they are forgoing opportunities to  
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cheat. Turning to the reported scores, mean reported scores are lower when voluntary-regulation decisions 
are public than when they are private. In the two public conditions, the mean score is 10.82, which is 
lower than in the two private conditions (13.57). This difference in means is statistically significant (t214 = 
3.67, p < 0.001), as is the difference in distributions of scores (z = 3.57, p < 0.001). Therefore, consistent 
with H1, we observe that public voluntary-regulation decisions yield both greater regulation and less 
misreporting than when decisions are made privately.  
In addition to increasing the percentage of participants who choose to be regulated, the public 
condition also yields lower reported scores among those who choose to be unregulated. In Figure 1, we 
present reported scores in the voluntary-regulation conditions by whether a subject chose to be regulated 
or  unregulated  and  by  whether  the  regulation  decision  was  made  privately  or  publicly.  For  those 
participants who opted for no regulation, mean reported scores are significantly higher for those in private 
conditions than for those in public conditions (16.13 vs. 13.21, t123 = 3.35, p < 0.005). In contrast, there is 
no significant difference in mean reported scores for those participants opting for regulation in the private 
vs. public conditions (8.00 vs. 8.68, t89 = 0.75). This indicates that the decline in misreporting that we 
observe in the public conditions, relative to when regulation choices are private, is driven both by an 
increase in the percent of participants choosing to be regulated and by a decrease in misreporting even 
among those participants who are unregulated. This is also our first piece of evidence that the effects of 
voluntary regulation may go beyond simply affecting the frequency of misreporting, but may also affect 
the magnitude of misreporting by those who are unregulated. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
4.3. Are participants influenced by others’ regulation choices?  
We also hypothesized that, in the public-sequential condition, participants’ regulation choices and 
misreporting would be influenced by others’ earlier choices (H2). Comparing the frequency with which 
regulation was chosen in the public-sequential and public-simultaneous conditions in Table 2 reveals no 
statistically significant differences in the frequency with which participants opt for regulation (51.9% vs. 
53.7%, χ
2(1) = 0.037) or the resulting mean reported scores (11.39 vs. 10.26, t106 = 1.08). Therefore, there 
appears  to  be  no  change  in  aggregate  behavior  when  public  decisions  are  made  simultaneously  or 
sequentially. 
However,  an  influence  of  sequential  decisions  emerges  when  we  explore  the  behavior  of 
participants across positions in the experiment. Recall that the subject with ID#1 acted first, ID#2 second, 
and so forth. Therefore, we can consider the behavior of participants in a session by ID number as a way 
of discerning the hypothesized dynamic effects in the sequential-public treatment. Table 3 presents the  
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voluntary-regulation choices by subject ID (position) for all sessions in this treatment. We order the 
sessions by the regulation choice of the participant who moved first in each session. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3 reveals a considerable influence of earlier movers on subsequent regulation choices, 
consistent  with  our  hypothesis.  Given  the  overall frequency  of  51.9%  with which  participants chose 
regulation  in  these  treatments,  we  would  expect  two  participants,  selected  at  random  and  deciding 
independently, to make the same choice 50.1% of the time. Yet we find that in 77.8% of choices, a 
participant repeated the choice made by the previous participant, which differs significantly from the 
above expected proportion under independence (z = 3.71, p < 0.001). In fact, the influence of early 
movers is so strong that, in the four groups in which the first mover chose regulation (the gray columns in 
Table 3), 80% of the subsequent participant choices were for regulation. On the other hand, in the five 
groups in which the first mover opted not to be regulated (the white columns in table 3), only 32% of 
subsequent participants opted for regulation. 
The difference in the adoption of regulation by early movers also affects the scores subsequently 
reported in each session. In the four sessions in which the first mover opted to be regulated, the mean 
reported score was 9.7 (10.4 if we omit the first mover), while in the five sessions in which the first 
mover chose no regulation it was 12.8 (12.0 if we omit the first mover). However, the difference, when 
we omit the first mover, is not statistically significant. 
4.4. Does private voluntary regulation affect unethical conduct? 
  The results presented above demonstrate that public voluntary-regulation decisions can affect 
unethical behavior, both through individuals’ concern about others knowing whether or not they opted for 
regulation and through individuals following the regulation choices made by earlier movers. We next 
study how unethical conduct is influenced by the possibility of forgoing regulation, even when voluntary 
regulation choices are made privately.  In such cases, the social influences of being observed and of 
observing others discussed above are unlikely to play a role. Since all participants can give themselves the 
option  to  misreport,  one  might  expect  outcomes  to  be  very  similar  to  the  no-regulation  condition. 
However,  as  we  hypothesized  earlier  (H3),  the  act  of  first  deciding  whether  one  wants  to  have  the 
opportunity to behave unethically may be psychologically distinct from simply having the opportunity to 
misreport. 
  From Table 2, we see that across both conditions with private voluntary regulation, 31.5% of 
participants  opt  to  be  regulated.  This  could  either  represent  only  those  participants  who  would  not 
misreport under no regulation (as in our null hypothesis) or some participants who would misreport under 
no regulation but decide to constrain themselves under voluntary regulation. In either case, however, we  
 
17 
 
might expect the resulting scores to be bounded above by those under no regulation (9.07). Instead, the 
mean score reported in the private conditions is 13.57 (private-simultaneous: 13.48, private-sequential: 
13.67), which is significantly higher (t136 = 4.17, p < 0.001). The distributions also differ between no 
regulation and private voluntary regulation (z = 3.99, p < 0.001). Therefore, we again find evidence 
contrary to the null hypothesis that voluntary regulation will yield similar outcomes to no regulation: in 
our data, allowing participants to choose to be regulated yields significantly higher misreporting, even 
though roughly one-third of participants choose to be regulated.  
4.5. Why is there greater unethical behavior under voluntary regulation? 
  The preceding result is somewhat surprising: If one-third of participants opt for regulation when 
doing so is a private decision, then why are mean reported scores higher than when no one is regulated? 
This suggests that, among those choosing to remain unregulated under voluntary regulation, misreporting 
is significantly higher. In this section, we attempt to shed light on what may be driving this result. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
  Table 4 presents the mean reported score by condition, broken down by whether a subject was 
regulated  or  unregulated.  In  the  two  baseline  conditions  (no  regulation,  mandatory  regulation), 
participants were either all regulated or unregulated, while in the voluntary-regulation conditions, each 
participant chose this for themselves. Interestingly, the mean reported scores are higher for participants 
under voluntary regulation, both in a comparison between those who chose not to be regulated and those 
who were in the mandatory no-regulation condition (14.94 vs. 9.07, t153 = 6.05, p < 0.001) and in a similar 
comparison between those who chose regulation and those subject to mandatory regulation (8.43 vs. 5.40, 
t119 = 3.46, p < 0.001).  
  This pattern of scores may have at least two explanations. First, regarding the change in scores of 
those who were regulated, whether voluntarily or mandatorily, those participants who opt for regulation 
when  doing  so  is  voluntary  may  tend  to  have  higher-than-average  ability  on  the  task.  Low-ability 
participants may opt out of regulation at higher rates, which explains the increase in scores, from 5.40 to 
8.43, among those who are regulated voluntarily. In short, it is likely that a different group of participants 
is  being  regulated  in  the  voluntary-regulation  condition  than  in  the  mandatory-regulation  condition.
5 
Below, we explore the evidence for such selection based on differences in individuals’ ability.  
  The above phenomenon alone does not explain why average scores also increase for voluntarily 
unregulated participants. A second phenomenon appears to be that those  participants choosing to be 
                                                 
5 Dohmen and Falk (2011) nicely demonstrate the impact of sorting, by productivity, in the context of varying 
output contracts. See also Schwieren and Weichselbaumer (2010), who find a tendency for low-ability types to cheat 
more in competitive tasks.  
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unregulated  subsequently  misreport  to  a  higher  degree  than  they  would  if  they  were  forced  to  be 
unregulated.  This  pattern  is  consistent  with  a  “license  to  cheat  effect,”  whereby  choosing  not  to  be 
regulated leads to greater misreporting than when no such choice is offered in the first place. We now turn 
to offering evidence for both of the above two effects. 
4.5.1. Selection effect 
  To  identify  selection  effects  in  determining  whether  participants  opt  for  regulation,  we  first 
identify whether any observable participant characteristics predict the decision to be regulated. Table 5 
reports the marginal effects from two probit regressions of the decision to be regulated, in the voluntary-
regulation conditions, on demographic characteristics obtained at the end of the experiment, as well as on 
a binary variable indicating whether the regulation decision was public.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
The four demographic variables in the first model are i) whether a participant is female, ii) a 
participant’s age, iii) whether a participant reports having at least one parent who graduated from college, 
and iv) whether a participant reports being religious. We also include, as a control, a variable for whether 
the regulation decision was made publicly (vs. privately). The second regression model also introduces 
binary variables to identify the most frequent college majors reported in our sample. Confirming our 
earlier analysis, if a participant’s regulation decision is public, then that participant is 24 percent more 
likely  to  opt  for  regulation.  The  only  other  variable  that  significantly  predicts  regulation  is  gender; 
females are roughly 18 percent less likely to opt for regulation than males. This suggests that some of the 
potential selection observed in Table 4 might be accounted for by the differential regulation behavior of 
females. 
  To explore whether selective adoption of regulation by gender might be at least partly responsible 
for the pattern of matrix scores we observe in Table 4, we consider the relative (reported) performance of 
males  and  females.  Table  6  presents,  by  treatment,  mean  reported  scores  separately  for  males  and 
females. Under mandatory regulation, we observe that females perform worse than men: the mean score 
is 6.94 for males and 3.64 for females, a difference that is statistically significant (t28 = 2.44, p = 0.02). 
The difference in performance under regulation might explain why women are less likely than men to opt 
for regulation (as we observed in Table 5).
6 
Insert Table 6 about here 
                                                 
6 This gender difference is consistent with prior findings showing that women perform worse than men at math, and 
that there is widespread belief in such a gender gap (Brown and Josephs, 1999; Fryer and Levitt, 2010).  
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Consistent with the idea that females are using the opportunity to misreport scores as a means of 
“catching up” with male scores, we see that in the no-regulation condition, the difference between male 
and female scores is small – in fact, reversed – and statistically insignificant. Thus, when females all have 
the  opportunity  to  misreport,  the  gender  gap  in  scores  disappears.  Moreover,  when  we  consider  the 
treatments with voluntary regulation, we see that the difference between male and female scores varies 
and that it tends to be smaller and less statistically significant in the private conditions, where there is less 
social pressure to adopt the regulation. Thus, consistent with the idea that disadvantaged individuals 
disproportionately opt to forgo regulation, we observe that females tend to be disadvantaged in the task, 
that they tend to forgo regulation in greater proportions, and that a lack of regulation allows them to 
overcome their disadvantage.  
4.5.2. “License to cheat” effect 
  In addition to the effect of selection on reported matrix scores, we also consider the possibility 
that the degree of misreporting is higher when participants opt for voluntary regulation. To do so, we 
attempt to identify the degree of additional misreporting when participants are unregulated voluntarily. 
  We first construct a rough measure of the predicted score a participant would obtain if regulated. 
We do this by considering all of the collected demographic variables and the extent to which they predict 
scores in the condition in which regulation is mandatory – i.e., when we know that scores are reported 
truthfully. We find one variable that reliable predicts scores: whether a participant is male or female (see 
Table 6). Using the gender variable, we construct a predicted score for each participant: 3.64 for female 
and 6.94 for males, a classification that accounts for 18 percent of the variance in actual scores.
7  
  Next, we compare the predicted  “true” scores obtained above with the actual reported scores 
obtained in each treatment. Table 7 presents the mean difference between participants’ predicted and 
actual scores, by treatment and by whether or not the participant was regulated. The predicted scores 
represent  the  mean  scores  one  would  expect  to  observe  in  each  case,  under  the  assumption  of  no 
misreporting, after controlling for the gender composition of  the sample producing those scores; the 
numbers in the table are the actual departure from this prediction.
8  
Insert Table 7 about here 
The first row of the table corresponds to the no-regulation condition and reveals that, on average, 
participants reported solving 3.56 more matrices than their predicted scores. This indicates that there was 
                                                 
7 The nature and significance of these results do not change if we use less reliable variables to generate predicted 
scores. For instance, including variables such as major and whether a subject’s parents attended college increases the 
variance explained in the initial model up to 50% but does not change the conclusion of our analysis in this section. 
8 Since the predicted scores were obtained from the condition with exogenous regulation, the difference for that 
condition is by definition zero, and we exclude it from the table.  
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some misreporting relative to the case in which all participants were regulated. Across all voluntary-
regulation conditions, those participants who choose to be regulated reported solving 2.61 matrices more, 
on average, than their predicted scores. This increase is consistent with selection on (unobserved, i.e., 
non-gender related) ability, which we discussed above. 
  However, the most striking aspect of Table 7 is the average reported score of participants who 
were voluntarily unregulated: these participants reported solving 9.56 more matrices, on average, than 
their predicted scores. This is over 2.5 times higher than when all participants are unregulated, and the 
difference in means between voluntary regulation and no regulation, for those who are not regulated, is 
statistically  significant  (t147  =  5.66,  p  <  0.001).  The  distributions  also  differ  significantly  in  a  non-
parametric rank-sum test (z = 4.88, p < 0.001). This finding is consistent with our interpretation that 
choosing to be unregulated, in contrast with regulation being entirely absent, give participants who opt for 
no  regulation  a  “license  to  cheat”  and  leads  to  higher  misreporting  than  when  all  participants  are 
unregulated. 
4.6. The presence of ethical spillovers 
  Finally, we can explore whether our treatments in the first (matrix) task, which differed in the 
extent to which participants were regulated, led to any differences in reported die-roll scores in the second 
task, when all participants were unregulated. That is, does the presence, absence, or voluntary nature of 
regulation in the first task create spillovers to the second task, when regulation does not exist? 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
  Figure 2 reports the distributions of reported die rolls, in task 2, by the preceding regulation 
condition in task 1. Following the mandatory-regulation condition, the mean reported die roll is 3.93, 
which is only slightly higher than the expected mean roll of 3.5, and the difference is not statistically 
significant (t29 = 1.38, p = 0.18). Thus, when everyone in the first task is regulated, behavior is generally 
ethical in the second task, in the sense that there appears to be little misreporting. However, when the first 
task is conducted under either no regulation or under voluntary regulation, mean die rolls are higher: 4.60 
and 4.69, respectively, and these both differ significantly from 3.5 (t29 = 3.65, p = 0.001; t215 = 11.66, p < 
0.001, respectively). 
  Table  8  presents  ordered  probit  regressions  of  the  reported  task  2  die-roll  score  on  task  1 
treatment and demographic variables; the omitted category is mandatory regulation, meaning that the 
reported coefficients measure differences with this treatment. In the first column, we find that  task 2 
misreporting is significantly higher following the no-regulation and voluntary-regulation conditions. The 
magnitude of misreporting is similar in both conditions; we fail to reject the restriction that the two 
coefficients in the first regression are equal (χ
2(1) = 0.13, p = 0.72). The second model estimates the  
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differences separately for each voluntary-regulation condition. We find similar degrees of misreporting 
following  all  of  the  voluntary-regulation  conditions;  we  fail  to  reject  the  restriction  that  all  of  the 
coefficients in the second model are equal (χ
2(4) = 0.88, p = 0.93). Thus, misreporting in the second (die-
roll) task is present in all conditions in which participants had the opportunity to misreport in the first 
(matrix) task, and the degree of misreporting is equal across all such conditions. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
  In  column  3,  we  find  that  misreporting  of  die-roll  scores  among  those  who  previously 
experienced voluntary regulation is driven primarily by those who opted for no regulation. Thus, the 
choice not to be regulated in task 1 suggests an individual type that is likely to engage in misreporting, as 
measured by the second (die-roll) task. This might suggest that females – who opt for no regulation and 
appear to misreport scores to a greater extent than males in the first task – might also engage in greater 
misreporting in the second task. The fourth model, however, finds that females do not report higher die-
roll scores than males; in fact, they report slightly lower scores than males (4.41 vs. 4.73). This stands in 
contrast to our results from the first task and suggests that females only exhibit a greater propensity to 
misreport when they are at a disadvantage (in our case, in task 1, because females’ ability is lower than 
that  of  the  males).  We  interpret  this  as  evidence  that  females  are  not  necessarily  more  inclined  to 
misreport than males; otherwise, they likely would do so in the die-roll task as well. Instead, it suggests 
that  women  (or  perhaps  any  other  group)  are  more  likely  to  opt  for  the  opportunity  to  engage  in 
misreporting when they are at a competitive disadvantage in order to make up for the disadvantage. 
Therefore, in task 1, when women were at a disadvantage, they chose to self-grade and engaged in more 
misreporting. However, in the die-roll task, in which everyone was on equal competitive footing, this 
greater willingness to misreport disappears. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we studied what happens when individuals can avoid or circumvent regulation and 
monitoring intended to curb unethical conduct. This ability effectively makes regulation voluntary. We 
compare our results against the null hypothesis that voluntary regulation should have similar effects as the 
complete absence of regulation. 
Consistent with other research (e.g., Gibson, et al., forthcoming; Gneezy, 2005; Gino et al., 2009; 
Mazar et al., 2008), we find that participants in a condition in which regulation is entirely absent report 
higher scores than when all scores are verified, though they do not fully exploit their ability to lie. 
However, we also find that when participants must first voluntarily decide whether to have their scores 
regulated, a significant proportion of participants opt for regulation, yet net misreporting is higher. We 
find evidence that those who opt for no regulation tend to be those who are likely to perform worse at the  
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competitive task and that the act of opting for no regulation induces greater misreporting – i.e., it provides 
individuals with a license to cheat to a greater extent. The “license to cheat” effect we observe joins a 
growing body of psychological research on “moral licensing” (Monin & Miller, 2001), which occurs 
when  past  moral  actions  lead  people  to  be  more  likely  to  engage  in  potentially  immoral  behavior 
afterwards,  by  diminishing  feelings  of  guilt  or  concern  about  appearing  unethical.  Similarly  to 
experiments demonstrating moral licensing, we find that the actions by which an individual arrives at a 
moral decision affect the subsequent choice to behave ethically.   
  In examining potential explanations for our pattern of findings, we highlighted an additional set 
of  results.  In  the  first  (matrix)  task,  we  observed  a  significant  difference  in  baseline  (regulated) 
performance among men and women; men performed better at the task. We also observed that women 
opted for less regulation when it was voluntary and also appeared to engage in more misreporting. Thus, 
an observable characteristic, gender, accounted for who did worse with no misreporting, who opted for 
less regulation, and who engaged in more misreporting. Yet, women did not misreport more frequently on 
a second task that did not involve competition based on ability. Our work is therefore related to previous 
research in economics that examines the link between gender and competition. For instance, Gneezy et al. 
(2003) found that women do not increase their effort as systematically as men in competitive settings. 
Similarly,  Gneezy  and  Rustichini  (2004)  found  that  boys  responded  more  strongly  than  girls  to 
competition.
9 Furthermore, related work demonstrates women are less likely to opt for  competition than 
are men (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). At first impression, our work can be interpreted as evidence 
that, when faced with the possibility of avoiding direct competition and instead misreporting one’s score, 
women do so more than men. Thus, one might view the gender differences we find in the first (matrix) 
task as evidence that women circumvent competition by engaging in cheating. 
  However, we find that there is no higher disposition to misreport among women in the second 
(die-roll) task. Therefore, our findings are subtler than simply “women cheat more on competitive tasks.” 
Instead, we interpret our findings as evidence that, in competitive situations, disadvantaged groups will be 
more likely to forgo regulation to eliminate their competitive disadvantage. Thus, the greater avoidance of 
regulation and misreporting by women appears to be context-specific and limited to environments in 
which women are competitively disadvantaged. In this vein, our results share features with recent findings 
by Schwieren and Weichselbaumer (2010), who found that women engaged in cheating behavior more 
often than men, but that this was less related to a gender difference than to differences in ability.  
Our results yield important policy implications. First, we demonstrate that regulation that can be 
avoided  produces  more  unethical  conduct  than  simply  an  absence  of  regulation  does.  This  counter-
intuitive finding results from greater misreporting when individuals opt for the ability to misreport than 
                                                 
9 But, see also Dreber, von Essen, and Ranehill (2011) for contrasting results.  
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when it is simply given to them. Thus, giving individuals or firms the ability to influence the degree of 
regulation or  monitoring  to  which they  are  subject  may  perversely  encourage  those  who  choose  lax 
regulations to behave more unethically than if no regulation were present. The fact that some individuals 
choose to open offshore bank accounts that allow them to hide earnings from tax authorities may lead 
them to subsequently hide earnings to a greater extent than they would if they could do so by law with all 
bank accounts. Similarly, giving employees or students the discretion of whether to have their behavior 
monitored or verified may yield more unethical conduct. Broadly, our results suggest the need to think 
carefully about the possibility that easily avoidable regulation may yield outcomes that are worse than 
simply having no regulation.  
  Our results also suggest that, in competitive situations, those who seek to avoid regulation may be 
those who are competitively disadvantaged in the underlying domain. Conversely, those who feel more 
confident  in  their  ability  to  win  without  misreporting  may  opt  to  be  regulated,  perhaps  out  of  a 
willingness to signal to outsiders that  they do not need to cheat. Thus, voluntary regulation has the 
interesting property of allowing those who are disadvantaged a greater opportunity to catch up to those 
with  greater  skill.  This  is  particularly  true  in  contexts  where  there  is  no  outside  pressure  to  adopt 
regulation (as in our private treatments). 
  We  also  find  some  interventions  that  can  be  used  to  influence  the  willingness  to  abide  by 
regulation. Making regulation choices public increases the adoption of voluntary regulation. Having early 
movers opt for regulation also influences those who make choices subsequently. Thus, a policymaker 
interested in obtaining compliance with regulation may be able to rely on social influences to achieve this 
result. 
  Finally, an important open question deals with how our results translate to other settings. For 
example, we use a competitive task, for reasons we describe earlier in the paper. But it is not transparent 
that our results would also obtain in contexts in which individuals are not competing, as is the case, for 
example, under piece-rate compensation. In such contexts, the importance of relative skill is likely to be 
weaker, diminishing the need for the disadvantaged group to opt for less regulation and engage in more 
misreporting. Nevertheless, our context is similar to that in many economics and organizational settings, 
where success is based on relative performance and where individuals or firms can select among varying 
degrees of transparency. Our findings suggest that, at least in some such contexts, the possibility of 
voluntary or avoidable regulation can yield perverse outcomes. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Experimental design overview  
  Voluntary Regulation    Mandatory 
  Sequential 
Choice 
Simultaneous 
Choice    Regulation  No Regulation 
Public Choice 
 
N = 54 
(9 sessions) 
 
N = 54 
(9 sessions)   
 
N = 30 
(5 sessions) 
 
N = 30 
(5 sessions) 
Private Choice  N = 54 
(9 sessions) 
N = 54 
(9 sessions)       
 
 
Table 2. Outcomes from the matrix task by condition 
Treatment  Mean score 
(std. dev.) 
Frequency of 
regulation 
No Regulation  9.07 (3.78)  0 
Mandatory Regulation  5.40 (4.00)  1 
Voluntary Regulation (Pooled - all conditions)  12.20 (5.67)  0.421 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Simultaneous)  13.48 (5.55)  0.296 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Sequential)  13.67 (5.65)  0.333 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Simultaneous)  10.26 (5.51)  0.537 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Sequential)  11.39 (5.37)  0.519 
  
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 3. Endogenous regulation choices by position (ID) in sequential-public condition 
  Session 
ID  S2  S9  S10  S31  S7  S19  S22  S26  S43 
1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
2  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
3  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  0 
4  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  0 
5  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  0 
6  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1  0 
Frequency of 
regulation  0.67  1.00  1.00  0.67  0.17  0.17  0.33  0.67  0.00 
Average reported 
score  10.2  8.0  9.5  11.0  14.3  14.8  8.5  9.8  16.3 
Average score 
(excluding ID#1)  11.0  8.6  10.2  11.8  13.2  13.8  8.6  8.2  16.2 
Note: Decisions to be regulated are marked 1 and decisions to be unregulated are marked 0. Columns in gray are 
those where the first subject (id=1) chose to be regulated. 
 
 
Table 4. Mean reported matrix score broken down by regulation condition 
  Mean reported Score 
Treatment  Unregulated 
Participants 
Regulated 
Participants 
No Regulation  9.07 (3.78)   
Mandatory Regulation    5.40 (4.00) 
Voluntary Regulation (Pooled – all conditions)  14.94 (4.98)  8.43 (4.20) 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Simultaneous)  16.00 (4.13)  7.50 (3.56) 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Sequential)  16.28 (4.03)  8.44 (4.76) 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Simultaneous)  11.92 (5.95)  8.83 (4.75) 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Sequential)  14.46 (5.25)  8.54 (3.68) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 5. Marginal effects from probit regression of decision to be regulated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * p<0.10, **  p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 and standard errors are clustered by session and in the parentheses. 
Variables  1.  2. 
Female  -0.172
** 
(0.067) 
-0.192
*** 
(0.064) 
Age  0.011 
(0.009) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
Parent Graduated College  0.076 
(0.066) 
0.075 
(0.069) 
Religious  -0.098 
(0.111) 
-0.067 
(0.138) 
Public Treatment  0.242
*** 
(0.079) 
0.249
*** 
(0.076) 
Major (Arts & Humanities)    0.125 
(0.180) 
Major (Business Administration)    0.001 
(0.148) 
Major (Economics)    0.015 
(0.206) 
Major (Engineering)    -0.026 
(0.116) 
Major (Sciences)    -0.048 
(0.113) 
Major (Social Sciences)    0.039 
(0.164) 
     
Observations  212  211 
Pseudo R
2  0.069  0.072 
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Table 6. Mean matrix score by gender and treatment 
Treatment 
Mean 
score 
(males) 
Mean 
score 
(females) 
Difference 
(male – female) 
No Regulation  8.57  
(3.29) 
9.90 
(4.70)  -1.33  t22 = 0.82 
p = 0.42 
Mandatory Regulation  6.94 
(4.20) 
3.64 
(3.00)  3.30  t28 = 2.44 
p = 0.02 
Voluntary Regulation (Pooled - Private treatments)  13.90 
(5.41) 
13.05 
(5.87)  0.85  t106 = 0.76 
p = 0.45 
Voluntary Regulation (Pooled - Public treatments)  12.19 
(5.45) 
9.18 
(5.02)  3.00  t106 = 2.95 
p = 0.004 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Simultaneous)  13.30 
(5.14) 
13.88 
(6.51)  -0.58  t52 = 0.36 
t = 0.72 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Sequential)  14.63 
(5.71) 
12.46 
(5.44)  2.17  t52 = 1.42 
p = 0.16 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Simultaneous)  11.76 
(5.96) 
7.90 
(3.77)  3.86  t52 = 2.64 
p = 0.01 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Sequential)  12.73 
(4.79) 
10.14 
(5.65)  2.59  t52 = 1.81 
p = 0.08 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Mean difference between reported and predicted matrix scores in competitive task by 
condition 
Treatment  Unregulated 
participants 
Regulated 
participants 
No Regulation  3.56 (4.50)   
Voluntary Regulation (Pooled – all conditions)  9.56 (4.81)  2.61 (3.84) 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Simultaneous)  10.19 (4.58)  1.39 (3.23) 
Voluntary Regulation (Private-Sequential)  10.99 (3.71)  2.61 (4.33) 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Simultaneous)  6.56 (5.32)  2.91 (4.49) 
Voluntary Regulation (Public-Sequential)  9.55 (4.93)  3.01 (3.09) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 8. Ordered probit regressions of reported score in die-roll task 
Variables  1.  2.  3.  4. 
No Regulation in Task 1  0.47
* 
(0.24) 
0.47
* 
(0.24) 
0.47
* 
(0.24) 
0.45 
(0.27) 
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(all conditions) 
0.53
*** 
(0.19)    0.28 
(0.20) 
0.24 
(0.19) 
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(chose no regulation)      0.48
*** 
(0.15) 
0.52
*** 
(0.14) 
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(Private-Simultaneous)    0.51
** 
(0.26)     
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(Private-Sequential)    0.61
*** 
(0.21)     
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(Public-Simultaneous)    0.45
* 
(0.25)     
Voluntary Regulation in Task 1 
(Public-Sequential)    0.56
*** 
(0.22)     
Female        -0.28
** 
(0.14) 
Observations  276  276  276  270 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The standard errors (clustered by session) are reported in the parentheses. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Reported matrix score for those choosing to be un/regulated by private and public 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Reported die-roll score (Task 2) by regulation condition (in Task 1) 
 
 